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Abstract: This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious 
mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts.  In Thomasson’s 
view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or 
“extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge.  I argue that 
Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct.  But the view of  consciousness
that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-
oriented experience is in no way given to itself—is not compatible with it and that it is not the point of 
view he adopts.  Rather, Thomasson’s view is, from a Husserlian vantage point, self-undermining in the 
same way that any genuinely skeptical view is self-undermining.  And this is one of the motives Husserl 
has for holding a non-transparent, same-order view of consciousness alongside his transparent method 
for self-knowledge acquisition.
§1 Introduction
Given the methodological primacy of Husserl’s principle of all principles,1 which takes the 
evidentiary legitimacy of adequate intuition for knowledge to be originary, absolute, and 
foundational, it may seem that the only plausible reading of Husserl’s view of self-knowledge 
would be an introspectionist reading.  The introspectionist about self-knowledge takes privileged 
self-knowledge—i.e., knowledge of one’s own mind which (i) does not rely on the same sort 
of evidence as our knowledge of the minds of others (immediate) and (ii) is not subject to the 
same sorts of error as our knowledge of other minds (authoritative)—to derive from an 
introspective capacity, which grants a special sort of access to our own mental states (grounding
immediacy), and which only the subject of experience can utilize (grounding authority).2  In a 
recent series of papers, Amie Thomasson (2003; 2005; 2006) argues that the introspectionist 
interpretation of Husserl’s method for acquiring privileged self-knowledge is false; that the 
proper understanding of Husserl’s methodology of the phenomenological reduction is “based 
in the idea that knowledge of one’s own experiences is in some sense based on outer 
observation of the world, rather than a direct inner observation of one’s own experiences” 
(Thomasson 2005, 116).  In other words, Thomasson interprets the phenomenological 
reduction as a transparent method for the acquisition of knowledge of one’s own conscious 
mental states, a method that answers questions about the nature of one’s lived experience by 
1. (Husserl 2014, §24). As here, whenever I cite Husserl’s work, I will refer to the section number; and
when necessary I will also refer to the page number of the original publication after the section number.
2. Henceforth, when I say “self-knowledge,” I will mean privileged self-knowledge as it is defined in this
sentence.
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answering questions about the world of which one is aware in having the experience.3  Thus, it 
bypasses reliance on introspection as a method of gathering evidence for self-attributive 
judgments for a method that does not rely on introspection at all to justify introspective 
judgments.
In the following, I will argue that Thomasson’s interpretation of Husserl’s basic method 
by which a subject acquires knowledge of her own mind—i.e., as an interpretation of what 
Husserl calls the “reflective modification” of consciousness—is correct.  But I will also argue 
that her (2006) attempt to pair Husserl’s transparent method for reflective self-knowledge with 
a “transparent” or “adverbial” conception of phenomenal consciousness—a view on which 
phenomenal consciousness consists in nothing other than a distinctive way of being conscious 
of the world outside the current conscious experience—is destined to fail; and that Husserl 
himself anticipates the failure of any such view in his arguments against “skeptical” views of 
reflective self-knowledge in the Ideas (§79).  So, if a transparent theory of self-knowledge is to 
be viable, it must be paired with a non-transparent conception of conscious experience in 
which first-order conscious experience of the world also involves some sort of awareness of the 
experience itself. 
I will first (§2) review Thomasson’s transparency interpretation of the phenomenological
reduction.  Then (§3) I will carefully examine Husserl’s initial presentation of the reflective 
modification of consciousness in his Ideas in order to support the exegetical claim that Husserl 
does pair a non-transparent, same-order view of consciousness with his transparent 
methodology of self-knowledge acquisition in the reflective modification of consciousness.  
After that (§4) I will present the argument against Thomasson’s attempt to pair a non-
transparent view of consciousness with Husserl’s transparent methodology of self-knowledge 
acquisition, an argument which claims that such a view succumbs to the problem that Husserl 
takes to be characteristic of all genuinely skeptical views: that it is ultimately self-undermining.  
Finally, (§5) I will sketch some of details of Husserl’s same-order conception of phenomenal 
consciousness in order to illuminate the role that it plays as a condition of the possibility (or 
“trascendental condition”) of transparent reflection before giving some closing remarks (§6).
§2 Thomasson’s Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction
Thomasson takes Husserl’s phenomenological reduction to be a method for acquiring intuitive 
3. Gareth Evans (1982) characterization of the transparency method of acquiring self-knowledge is the
most often cited. But, as Richard Moran (2001) points out, Roy Edgley (1969) seems to have been the
first to use this term in this application.
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self-knowledge, not a method that itself presupposes intuitive self-knowledge or self-awareness 
as an evidential ground for self-knowledge.  Thus, because it is a method that yields, but does not
presuppose or rely on self-intuition, it is a transparent methodology.  
Thomasson argues that we can summarize Husserl’s method of the phenomenological 
reduction—the basic methodological tool for the new science of pure phenomenology, a 
science of the essence of consciousness, presented in the Ideas—as the employment of two 
“conceptual transformations that license us to move, e.g., from claims about the world 
represented to claims about our ways of representing the world” (Thomasson 2006, 12).  We 
might represent these “conceptual transformations” as something like inference rules that 
“license” (as Thomasson says) the transition from claims about the world (that one is conscious
of in a mental event) to claims about these conscious mental events themselves and then, 
ultimately, to claims about their essential nature.  As we shall see in the next section, Husserl 
prefers to speak of these as “modifications” that the conscious subject can make to her own 
conscious experience.  But insofar as both terms—inference and conscious modification—refer 
to activities of the subject carried out in accordance with essentail law, and insofar as it is the 
same essential law that validates the transitions in both cases, we can take these two otherwise 
importantly different kinds of activities to be equivalent in terms of their epistemic import for 
self-knowledge.  
Before turning to Thomasson’s presentation of the two conceptual transformations that 
make up Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I want to point out how they ground the 
privileged status of self-knowledge with prior reliance on introspection.  First, as we shall see is 
the case with the first transformation, since only I, the conscious subject, can perform it, given 
that it is a transformation rule whose validity requires the presence of a conscious experience, 
and given the peculiar privacy of conscious experience to the subject, then it will always yield 
knowledge that only I (the conscious subject) am in a position to have.  This grounds the 
authority of privileged self-knowledge.  And since this method (when performed in the 
appropriate circumstances, i.e., in the circumstance of my having a conscious experience) 
always yields true results, this grounds the immediacy of privileged self-knowledge.  Thus, in 
Husserl’s method, we have an account of privileged self-knowledge without reliance on 
introspection as a special epistemic ground.  Rather, all we need is conscious first-order 
experience and the (general purpose) cognitive capacities to execute the methods of the 
phenomenological reduction embodied in the conceptual transformations. 
So, what are these conceptual transformations?  The first Thomasson calls the “reductive” 
transformation.  This is a transformation (or general inference schema) by which we can move 
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from our own first-order, world-oriented representation to a claim that “mentions” this 
representational state as being such-and-such.  Consider, for example, the exemplification of 
this in the method of semantic ascent, where a subject can move from asserting
1. Bonnie is on the train
to asserting
2. Someone asserted that Bonnie is on the train.
When 1 is asserted, 2 is necessarily true.  And one need not have any special introspective capacity
to know fact expressed in 2 when it is inferred from 1.  However, it is important to realize, it is 
not that the fact asserted in 1 implies or entails the fact asserted in 2—indeed, the assertion made 
in 1 might be false, Bonnie might not be on the train at all, and the intended inference would 
still reliably yield a truth in 2.  This is so because it is that the assertion of the fact in 1 entails the 
fact asserted in 2 and that makes 2 a true proposition.  In other words, the reductive 
transformation as applied to assertions is a logical consequence of “the rules of use of the 
concept stated” or the concept assertion: that, when one states or asserts that P one can, in every 
case, truthfully infer that someone is stating or asserting that P (Thomasson 2005, 129).  
The shifts in the content of 1 that come out in the structure of 2 under the reductive 
transformation are two-fold: “The content (Bonnie is on the train) is transformed into a 
proposition (that Bonnie is on the train), and the force (stated) is extracted from the way in 
which the proposition is presented in the basic sentence (in this case assertion)” (Thomasson 
2005, 129).  And, insofar as these same shifts in structure can be carried out on other forms of 
mental representation (e.g., on perception—seeing that P —> it was seen that P; remembering 
that P —> there was a remembering that P; and so on), then the reductive transformation 
embodies a method for coming to know about the intentional content and intentional mode of 
every one of our first-order intentional experiences.
Thomasson argues that the reductive transformation is the basic conceptual structure at 
work in Husserl’s idea of “bracketing.”  She argues for this, first, by pointing out that the 
German term Einklammerung is the word used to refer to what in English is called, “quotation 
marks.”  And, of course, one key function of placing a sentence or term in quotes is to separate 
it from us as an item of use, while putting it forward simply as something that we are 
mentioning.  Her second argument relies on the strong analogy between the two-part 
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transformation carried out by a reductive transformation—where the content (both mode and 
intentional representation) of the first-order representation is retained, but the “force” of the 
representation on me is removed or put out of play.  Thus, when I bracket my conscious belief 
that P, I do not transform the belief into a doubt or mere presentation.  Rather, the belief 
remains a belief, but the belief is put to a side and not utilized, but rather only mentioned.4  
And she also points out the striking analogy between her discussion of the method of reductive
transformation and the kind of transformation of experience that Husserl describes under the 
heading of the epoché, such as when he says that
In relation to each thesis we are able, with complete freedom, to exercise this 
distinctive epoché, a certain withholding of judgment that is compatible with the unshaken and even 
unshakeable (because evident) conviction of truth.  The thesis is “put out of action,” bracketed, it 
is transformed into the modification “bracketed thesis,” the judgment simply into the 
“bracketed judgment.”  (Husserl 2014, §32, p. 55)
If this is correct, then the reductive transformation can be applied not only to assertions or to 
beliefs that one still holds at the time of the reduction, but to any intentional experience 
whatever as it is lived.  For insofar as intentional experience is a particular mental occurrence that 
represents the world in a particular way, with a certain force (positing, neutralized, with 
doubt), then the transformations will produce a mode of awareness of this mental state that 
preserves its basic structure, it just distances it from the subject as her means of engaging with 
the world to an observance of her way of engaging with the world.  
The first conceptual transformation, in Thomasson’s reading, is then paired with a second
conceptual transformation, which Thomasson calls the “hypostatizing transformation,” to yield 
knowledge of the particular experience—suspended “in the brackets”—as an instance of a 
general type or essence of experience.  Thomasson models this as an inference from a claim 
such as
2. Someone is asserting that Bonnie is on the train.
4. To illustrate and elucidate this further, consider, the difference between—to use an example from
(Dancy 2000, 125)—having a belief self-consciously and having it merely as an object of reflective
consideration. Suppose that I believe that there are pink rats in my shoes and, as a result, call the
exterminator to get rid of them. This is to have a belief in a completely self-conscious way, i.e., in a way
where my awareness of the belief is nothing over and above the way that I take the world to be. This is a
mode of having a belief that is not “bracketed.” But now suppose that I have this same belief, but I call my
therapist instead, to get rid of the belief. Here I have the belief in a bracketed mode, it is a feature of
myself that I mention, but do not employ. And this is a difference easily and, it seems, adequately captured
in the conceptual shifts Thomasson envisions occurring between 1 and 2.
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to
3. There is an assertion that Bonnie is on the train.
Now, unlike the link between 1 and 2, the connection between 2 and 3 is a fairly trivial logical 
relation between the contents of 2 and 3, i.e., of what is asserted in each.  Indeed, setting aside 
certain sophisticate worries about ontological commitment, 3 can seem nothing more than a 
paraphrase of 2. 
 Thomasson takes this inference to be a safe and sure way to bring out a distinctive 
ontological commitment to general types or essences that is characteristic of talk about ordinary
objects and experience: that each of these are understood as entities whose conditions of 
existence are specified in a general, more or less determinate type.  And, she argues, this is the 
way to understand Husserl’s conception of Eidos.  And here, of course, the kind of cognitive 
engagement that Husserl would invoke here to grasp this general type would involve the 
processes of free imaginative variation in the service of the discernment of eidetic structure.  
Now this whole ontological view, of course, can be criticized (and has been, especially amongst
Husserl’s critics).  But since my critical evaluation of Thomasson’s interpretation does not 
invoke any worries about this aspect of her reading, I will set aside such scruples for now and 
simply work under the assumption that Thomasson’s reading of this step in the 
phenomenological reduction—the step that takes from an intuition of the particular experience
to an intuition of essence—is correct.5
The important point here is that since this entire process for acquiring self-knowledge 
does not require any observations about our own mental states at the start or as an epistemic 
ground of the attributive judgment carried out in step 2, it is not a view that fits the 
introspectionist mold.  Rather, it is view that is better characterized as extrospectionist or 
“transparent” in the sense that it answers questions about the nature of the mind only by 
consider how the world is experienced.  So, it does not invoke introspection or inner-observation
as a pre-condition of self-knowledge.
§3 Husserl on the Pre-Givenness of Conscious Experience and
Motivation
Thomasson (2006) departs from Husserl, however, in claiming that the execution of the 
5. For more on Thomasson’s interpretation of Husserl’s conception of eidos and the ontological
commitments that it involves, see Thomasson (2017). For a critical evaluation of Thomasson’s
interpretation, see Tolley (2017).
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transparent method of phenomenological reduction can be and should be joined with a transparent
conception of conscious experience.  On the non-transparent conception of consciousness, as 
Thomasson (2006, 9) puts it, “conscious states are states we are (in some sense) aware of.”  
Thomasson, instead, embraces an “adverbial theory of consciousness: understanding seeing a 
tree consciously as a way the seeing is done, such that I am aware of the tree (not aware of my 
seeing).”  In other words, Thomasson foregoes analysis of the difference between conscious and 
unconscious experiences as a consisting in a further awareness of awareness present in the former, 
but lacking in the latter.  Rather, it is simply an intrinsic part of the way in which the subject is 
aware of the world in the former (“phenomenally aware,” as it is often put in contemporary 
analytic philosophy) that is not present in the latter.  And she argues that, insofar as Husserl’s 
transparent methodology for self-knowledge does not require any prior awareness of one’s own
mental states, it is open to a neo-Husserlian phenomenologist to pair this with an adverbialist 
or transparent conception of consciousness as completely transparent, i.e., as consisting solely 
in an awareness of the world outside the mind.
There are two prominent non-transparent conceptions of consciousness with which 
Thomasson contrasts her own view.  One is the higher-order awareness view, on which a 
mental state is conscious because a separate mental state of the same subject represents it.  The 
other is the same-order awareness view, on which a mental state is conscious because it, in 
some way, involves an awareness of itself.  Husserl is, as I will argue here, a same-order theorist.
In Ideas, Husserl talks of the process of acquiring self-knowledge of one’s own experience 
as a process of “reflection.”6  And Husserl’s first use of the term “Reflectiv” in the Ideas I comes at 
§38, which is a further addition to a series of observations made in §37.  In §37, Husserl 
illustrates how the total intentional object of a conscious intentional experience is not always to
be identified with the object that the subject “apprehends,” i.e., the object that the subject attends
to or focuses on in the experience.  Husserl observes that while it is the case that “we cannot be 
turned toward a thing otherwise than in the manner of apprehending,” it would nevertheless be
a mistake to think that “a consciousness’s intentional object […] means the same as an apprehended 
object”—a mistake motivated by the fact that in simply thinking about or saying something 
about a thing, “we have made it an object in the sense of something apprehended” (Husserl 
2014, §37, p. 67).7
6. “[…] [T]he phenomenological method moves entirely in acts of reflection” (Husserl 2014, §77, p.
144). “Reflection is, as we may also put it, the name for consciousness’s method of knowing
consciousness at all” (Husserl 2014, §78, p. 147).
7. This observation anticipates Charles Siewert’s (1998, 194–97) criticism of higher-order theories as
falling prey to the “consciousness-of trap.”  
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For example, “In the act of evaluating […] we are turned toward the value, in the act of 
joy we are turned toward what is enjoyable, in the act of love we are turned toward the beloved,
in acting toward the action, without apprehending any of that” (Husserl 2014, §37, p. 67).  
When I saw the sunshine this morning (breaking through for a few hours in the gray winter 
months) and judged that it is lovely, I am not attending to/apprehending the value of 
“loveliness,” but rather I am attending to the sunshine—more precisely, attending to the 
sunshine as being lovely.  To attend to/apprehend the sunshine’s property of loveliness would 
require turning my attention away from the sunshine and towards this property of the 
sunshine.  And this requires transforming the intended but not apprehended value-property of 
loveliness into “an apprehended object in a unique ‘objectifying turn’”—that is, into a 
“‘having’ [of] the value “as an object” in the particular sense of an apprehended object, such as 
we must have it in order to apply predicates to it-and so, too, in all logical acts that refer to it” 
(Husserl 2014, §37, p. 67).  In other words, it would subject the original experience of 
apprehending the sunshine to an essential modification—a transformation—that would yield 
the act of apprehending the loveliness (of the sunshine), and setting up the actualization of 
further conscious determinations of and judgments about this value-property.
At the beginning of the section following the one containing these observations, Husserl 
writes the following:
We may add further that, living in the cogito [i.e., a conscious intentional experience, 
which has the essential characteristic of apprehending something],8 we do not 
consciously have the cogitatio itself as an intentional object.  Yet at any time it can 
become that.  The intrinsic possibility of a "reflective" shift of focus is an essential 
property of it, and naturally [this is] a shift of focus in the form of a new cogitatio that is
directed at it in the manner of simply apprehending it.  In other words, any cogitatio can 
become the object of a so-called “inner perception,” and then, as a further 
consequence, the object of a reflective evaluation, an approval or disapproval, and so 
forth. (Husserl 2014, §38, p. 68)
Given this context, we can see that Husserl is here doing two things.  First, he is drawing a 
sharp distinction between the kind of awareness one has of properties of an object in a mode of
consciousness wherein one attends to the object as having such-and-such properties (i.e., where 
the object is apprehended, but the properties are not apprehended but still given as a part of the
total intentional object of the act).  However, second, he is also marking a similarity to the 
givenness of unapprehended properties.  Just as unapprehended but merely intended properties
of apprehended objects can become apprehended by means of a “modification” of 
8. See (Husserl 2014, §35).
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consciousness, so any intentional act can be subjected to a reflective modification, which transforms the
act itself into an apprehended object of awareness.  The key difference here, however, is that the 
first-order, world-oriented act does not take itself as an intentional object.  So, reflection is a 
different kind of modification from the shift of attention that transforms unapprehended 
properties into apprehended properties, since it is a shift to an intentional object that was not at 
all intended in the original act.  Furthermore, it is a modification that is applicable only to intentional 
acts (and not to objects of intentional acts).  
Now, all of this might seem nothing more that grist for Thomasson’s mill.  For it seems to
affirm that, whatever else may be required for reflective self-knowledge, prior awareness of 
one’s own experience as a part of the complete intentional object of the experience to be 
reflectively apprehended is not one of the requirements.  However, things become more 
complicated on this front when Husserl takes up the theme of reflection again, this time with a 
concern to further articulate the conditions of the possibility (or what I will also call the 
“transcendental conditions”) of the reflective modification that results in immanent perception.
Husserl writes,
Experience [Erlebnis] inherently has the kind of being such that a discerning perception 
can direct its focus in a completely immediate way at every actual experience that is 
alive as an originary present [Gegenwart]. That happens in the form of “reflection,” which 
has the remarkable property that what is perceptually apprehended in it is characterized
intrinsically as something that not only is and persists within the focus that perceives it,
but already was before this focus turned toward it. “All experiences are conscious”—this 
statement means then, specifically with respect to intentional experiences, that they are 
not only consciousness of something and not only on hand as such [als das … vorhanden] 
when they are themselves objects of a reflecting consciousness but that they are already 
there, unreflected, as a “background,” and thus that they are intrinsically ready to be 
perceived, in a sense analogous, at least initially, to how things that we do not attend to 
[that is, things not apprehended] are there in our outer visual field. (Husserl 2014, 
§45, pp. 83–84)
In interpreting this passage, it is helpful to note that in the section immediately 
preceding the section from which this quote comes, Husserl argues that it is essential to the 
consciousness of material things (such as mid-sized dry goods) that they are only ever, at any 
given moment, given imperfectly and indeterminately, where this indeterminacy 
necessarily means determinability of a firmly prescribed style.  It points in advance [deutet vor] to 
possible manifolds of perception that, continuously passing over into one another, 
merge into the unity of a perception, a unity in which the continuously persisting 
thing shows new (or recurring old) “sides” again and again, in ever new series of 
profiles. (Husserl 2014, §44, p. 80)
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In other words, it is a part of the transcendental conditions of apprehending consciousness of 
material things that “we are conscious of them in a certain way already, namely, as something 
that we have not paid attention to, and that means, in their case, insofar as they appear 
[erscheinen]” (Husserl 2014, §45, p. 84).  What this observation sets out, in other words, is (1) a 
determination of the essence of what Husserl calls “appearance,” and (2) an essential 
correlation between the apprehension or attentive awareness of a material thing (which makes 
it a possible subject of cognitive determination and judgment) and its manifestation in 
appearance, i.e., its essentially imperfect manifestation in an infinite series of perceptions that 
altogether constitute a determination of a firmly prescribed style.  For a material object to be an
intentional object of perceptual consciousness is for it to have a determinable indeterminacy, for
it to be caught up manifolds of possible perceptions of the same object that yield further 
determination.  This is part of what it is for perception to be perception of a transcendent, 
“external” thing, insofar as perception does not create but rather discloses objects.  And it also (3) 
points out that a transcendental condition of the performance of the transformation that turns 
unapprehended objects into apprehended objects is the fact that objects are intended by 
appearances in the background of current lived experience.  For it is the structure of appearance
that motivates the shift in attention that makes an object an object of apprehension.  As Husserl 
writes,
The background field, understood as the field of what can be observed in a 
straightforward way, encompasses, indeed, only a small part of my environment. The 
phrase “it is there” [in the background] means rather that possible and, to be sure, 
continuously and coherently motivated series of perceptions with ever new fields of 
things (as unnoticed backgrounds) lead from current perceptions, with the actually 
appearing background field, up to those very connections among perceptions, in 
which precisely the relevant thing would come to appear and be apprehended. (Husserl
2014, §45, p. 84)
Analogously, Husserl argues, the transcendental conditions of “immanent perception”—
or the conditions of the possibility of apprehending awareness of experience itself—requires 
“unreflected experience [to] fulfill certain conditions of readiness [Bedingungen der Bereitschaft], 
although in a manner completely different [from material thing perception] and in keeping 
with its own essence” (Husserl 2014, §45, p. 84).  Just as for perception of material things, 
these conditions of readiness for reflective apprehension must account for the sense that 
reflective experience is not a productive consciousness, but rather a disclosive consciousness, that is, 
a consciousness of something that was “already there” as “background.”  And this requires that 
the experience be something the subject is aware of as “already there” before the reflection is 
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carried out on it, so that a reflective shift of attention to the experience can be motivated and 
carried out by the subject.  However, the conditions of readiness for reflective apprehension (or 
“immanent perception”) of a lived experience are importantly different from the conditions of 
readiness for outer perceptual apprehension of a material thing insofar as an experience cannot 
“appear” incompletely and in modes of appearance.  The experience is, rather, (if not different 
from) then at least given in the same way as the mode of appearance itself.  It is a kind of 
background givenness that motivates reflection, but not by means of a structure of appearance.9
To summarize, then, the results of Husserl’s initial and preliminary characterization of 
the transcendental conditions of reflective self-knowledge in the Ideas:
1. Reflective consciousness is the result of a transformation carried out on intentional
experience, which does not just transform an unapprehended intentional object of the 
experience into an apprehended object, but which transforms the experience itself into
an apprehended object, even though the experience did not previously have itself as an 
intentional object.
2. It is a transcendental condition of reflective consciousness that the experience 
apprehended in reflection be already, in some manner, “there” to be apprehended, as 
something “given” but not intended in the experience itself; and this givenness 
motivates a reflective shift of attention.  In other words, the experience that is a 
possible object of reflective apprehension must already involve some awareness of itself,
prior to reflective apprehension of it.
3. But the background, unreflective givenness of an experience to itself, insofar as it 
is a possible object of reflection, is not an appearance of the experience and it is not a 
givenness of the experience as a part of the intentional content of the experience itself. 
Rather, it is a sui generis form of conscious giveness.
Going back to Thomasson: while it is clear that Thomasson’s interpretation of Husserl’s 
method of phenomenological reflection is consistent with his general characterization of 
reflection (in particular, noting the coincidence between point 1 and Thomasson’s 
characterization of the reductive transformation), her commitment to a transparency 
conception of consciousness is not consistent with Husserl’s understanding of the 
transcendental conditions—the conditions of the possibility—of reflective consciousness itself.  
9. For more on Husserl’s concept of motivation and its importance for his systematic philosophy, see
Walsh (2017).
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For the conditions of preparedness for this kind of consciousness, to Husserl’s mind, clearly 
requires that the experience be already, in some way, given to itself in the experience itself, even
if not as an intentional object that appears in the experience.  In other words, if consciousness is
to be reflectively apprehended, it must involve some sort of pre-reflective, non-objectivating 
awareness of itself.
§4 Why Prefer Husserl’s View?
What reason is there to prefer Husserl’s pre-reflective same-order awareness view of 
consciousness over Thomasson’s?  Thomasson (2006) offers some arguments against same-
order views that she believes raise problems for same-order theories that her own adverbial 
theory does not face.  So, all other things being equal, the adverbial theory is to be preferred.  
However, alongside the fact that Thomasson’s arguments are not convincing (as I shall argue in 
§5 below), all other things are not equal between the adverbial and the same-order view that 
Husserl advances.  For the adverbial theory faces a skeptical problem—a problem of 
undermining the conditions of the truth of the theory that Thomasson advances in the very 
conditions of the possibility of her theory—which is outlined in an argument Husserl gives 
against “skeptical” views of reflective consciousness in the Ideas (Husserl 2014, §79).  
For Husserl, the common characteristic of all skeptical views in philosophy is that they 
are self-undermining.
Every genuine skepticism, of whatever kind and orientation, shows itself by way of the 
intrinsic absurdity of implicitly presupposing, in its argumentation, as conditions of the
possibility of its validity, just what, in its theses, it denies. (Husserl 2014, §79, p. 155)10
The skepticism about self-knowledge that Husserl addresses in Ideas is a skepticism about 
the power of reflective self-awareness, voiced in a critical review Theodore Lipps’s views by 
Henry J. Watt, to yield knowledge of experience as it is prior to being an object of reflection (Husserl 
2014, §79).  Watt argues that reflection cannot yield self-knowledge because, since first-order 
experience is not already a knowing of itself, the only way in which it could become a self-
knowing is by means of an essential modification.  Thus, the object it would come to know 
would not be of its pre-reflective self, but only of itself as an object of reflection (Husserl 2014, §79, 
pp. 152–153).  Now, Thomasson is not, like Watt, denying that reflection can yield knowledge 
of pre-reflectie experience as it is prior to reflection; rather, this is, in her view, guaranteed by 
10. See also (Husserl 1970, Prolegomena, §32). This is a line of argument that he probably picked up
from Kant, who used it to limit the scope of Pyrrhonian skepticism. See Forster (2010, chap 12) for
discussion of this idea in Kant.
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the reductive transformation rule.  The skepticism in Thomasson’s view arises from her positive 
claim about the structure of pre-reflective experience: that it lacks any sort of awareness of 
itself.  The problem with this is that it undermines its own knowability by denying a condition 
of its own possibility, the condition of having a rational motive for making a reflective 
judgment in the circumstance of having a conscious experience.  
Let me spell this out: (1) In denying the pre-reflective givenness of a lived experience to 
the subject of the experience, Thomasson undermines the very possibility of executing the 
reductive transformation.  And (2) since her thesis about the nature of conscious experience—
that it involves only awareness of the world, not an awareness of the experience itself at all—is a 
thesis that can be confirmed only by recourse to evidence about experience as it is lived (i.e., not 
reflected, but just lived through), then it denies any possibility for Thomasson’s thesis to be 
confirmed as true.  Therefore, (3) if Thomasson’s thesis is true, there is no way that one could 
honestly and knowingly assert it to be true.  For the condition of the possibility of such an act is
undermined by the truth of the claim to be asserted.  Therefore, it is true, it is not something 
we can know to be true.
Let’s take up and clarify each of these claims in turn.
1. According to Thomasson, the complete field of awareness of a conscious subject is the world 
outside the mind.  It is focused completely on the world, and it does not involve any awareness 
of itself in any form.  Now, according to the reductive transformation, I have epistemic license 
to infer the claim
S: I φ that P (where φ stands in for some particular mode of awareness—perception, 
positing thought, doubt)
on any occasion where I have an experience with this content (with this mode of presentation 
φ and this content P).  But if all that I am aware of in my experience is the world beyond this 
experience—i.e., aware of whatever it is in the world that P is about—then there is no 
indication to me in having a conscious experience that I am in a position to apply the reductive 
transformation to it.  In other words, I am in no way motivated to apply the reductive 
transformation to my current conscious experience, and it seems as if there is no way that I 
could be so motivated.11  Therefore, even if we grant the validity of the transformation rule for 
11. As Victor Caston (2006, 3) puts this point, voicing this claim against Thomasson’s view, “what good
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acquiring self-knowledge, it will be of no use to a conscious subject in the process of acquiring
self-knowledge.  For the subject will never be able to know that she is in a position to apply the 
transformation.  Therefore, the truth of Thomasson’s adverbial theory of consciousness 
undermines the possibility for one to perform the reductive transformation.
2. Thomasson’s adverbial conception of consciousness requires confirmation on the basis of 
evidence about the nature of first-order, unreflective lived experience.  But if reflective 
knowledge of first-order lived experience is not possible (as per her thesis, as made clear in 1.),
then Thomasson’s adverbial conception of consciousness cannot be known, insofar as 
knowledge requires evidential grounding.
3. To know a claim to be true, one must have evidential grounding for one’s knowledge.  
Furthermore, to honestly assert a claim as something that one knows, one must know that one 
at least believes that one has evidential grounding for what is asserted.12  But insofar as the truth
of Thomasson’s thesis denies the availability of evidential ground for self-attributive judgment 
(as per 1), then it also denies the possibility of a subject honestly asserting the truth of 
Thomasson’s thesis.
Therefore, not only is Thomasson’s thesis about consciousness self-undermining in terms
of removing the possibility of its being known by a subject (by removing the availability of the 
relevant evidential ground), it is also self-undermining in terms of removing the possibility of 
it’s being honestly asserted at all.  In short, not only is it unknowable, it is also absurd.
§5 The Pre-Reflective Givenness of Consciousness
But the self-undermining and absurd consequence of Thomasson’s adverbial theory of 
consciousness in conjunction with Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (or reductive 
transformation) makes the articulation of the structure of self-consciousness in lived, 
does all this do me, if I don’t already have some awareness of the fact that they do obtain? Otherwise,
wouldn’t the conceptual connections here equally license third-person judgements about our mental
experiences, just as they plainly do in the case of speech acts? How, in short, do these connections speak
to either the immediacy or privileged access that first-person knowledge appears to have? It is not clear
how the connections involved here give us any distinct kind of leverage. […] Adding the requirement that
such states must be conscious won’t help on the current account: for Thomasson, conscious states are
states in which we are aware of the world, and not those in which we have some internal awareness of
the state itself. The question still remains: what puts us in a distinctive position with regard to our own
mental states, if we do not also have an awareness that we are having them? How will it help us, in
particular, to discern features of that experience, such as its modality—whether, for example, we are
seeing the shape of an object rather than feeling it?”
12. For defense of this claim, see Marcus and Schwenkler (forthcoming, §2).
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unreflected experience all the more pressing for the viability of Husserl’s view.  Therefore, in 
this section, I will review Thomasson’s reason for preferring the adverbial view over the same-
order view in order to show how they are not convincing as objections to Husserl’s view.  
Furthermore, I will show how Husserl’s view can address the objections to same-order views 
arising from the Heidelberg school.  Addressing these two objections from the perspective of 
Husserl’s view will in turn help elucidate how the pre-givenness of consciousness overcomes 
the objection levied against Thomasson’s view.
Thomasson argues that same-order views face an insurmountable dilemma building on 
the question of how conscious experiences represent themselves.  If experiences do represent 
themselves as objects, then the state must have a two-dimensional representational content.  But
then this raises a problem of how to individuate a mental state that has two representational 
contents.  Since mental states are individuated by their contents, then it seems impossible to 
have a single mental state that has two representational contents.  Indeed, it seems safer just to 
go back to a higher-order view.  However, if the same-order theorist does not posit two 
dimensions of representational content, then “they seem ill-suited to help explain the evidence 
that motivated adopting inner awareness accounts of consciousness in the first place” 
(Thomasson 2006, 6).  Therefore, there seems no reason not to adopt the adverbial 
transparency view instead.
But this argument is not convincing against Husserl, since he can easily get around the 
first horn of the dilemma.13  This is because he denies that conscious experiences are 
individuated by their representational contents, and this is a commitment that has characterized
his view from early in his career.  In the Logical Investigations, for instance, Husserl makes sense of 
the possibility for one conscious experience (what he there calls an “act”) to having multiple 
intentional contents by taking intentional contents as universal types (or, in contemporary 
metaphysical jargon, “properties”) and the having of an intentional content by an act as the 
instantiation of this type in the act.  Therefore, insofar as it is not impossible for one thing to 
exemplify multiple properties at once, it is also not impossible for the same act to have two 
different intentional contents at the same time.14
However, even though Husserl has the theoretical tools to make sense of an experiential 
positing of itself as a part of its total intentional object, as we have seen in §3, he does not opt 
for this.  And, it seems, he does this for reasons of phenomenological adequacy.  While he 
13. Caston (2006, 4) makes this same observation, except he does not, as I do here, also argue that
Husserl has the resources to resist Thomasson’s objection in this way as well.  
14. For further discussion of this view of meaning and the important implications of the possibility of one
act having many contents for Husserl’s theory of knowledge and mind, see Kidd (forthcoming).
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recognizes that it is possible to attribute to an act a robustly rich total intentional object, which 
involves both an aspect of the content that is attended to/apprehended and a potentially large 
number of aspects that are not, but are merely intended, he does not admit the experience itself
to be a part of the overall intentional object of the act.  Indeed, he doesn’t even admit it as a 
part of the background that appears to the subject as objects in the periphery of my visual field 
appear without being apprehended.  And this is so because this just not how the current lived 
experience itself is given to the subject of the experience.  Rather, the experience “is there,” in 
the sense that a coherently motivated shifting of one’s attention, a motivated reflective 
transformation is always available to the subject of conscious experience.  But this does not 
happen through the content of a coherently motivated series of appearances, as it does for material 
things in the background of consciousness.
So, how does it happen?  In what way is one’s own conscious experience given to one, 
such that it motivates a reflective turning toward the experience?  Husserl answers this question
largely in negative characterizations, by contrast with the background appearances of material 
things and their motivating function, in the Ideas.  And I do not have space to go into a positive 
characterization of it here that would be clear enough to avoid dangerous ambiguity.  But, just 
by way of a general indication, it is clear that the pre-givenness of consciousness to itself in 
experience, which functions as an ever present motive for the reflective modification (i.e., for 
what Thomasson calls the reductive transformation), is a fixed structure of the basic self-
temporalizing, originally flowing-off of conscious experience.  That it is essential to my living 
present awareness, prior to any reflective self-regard, that it is a manifestation to the subject of 
experience, albeit not as a background appearance.  As Zahavi puts it, “The absolute flow of 
simply is the pre-reflective self-manifestation of our experiences” (Zahavi 1998, 155).  In other
words, it is built into the very structure of our experience—be it of the transcendent world of 
material things or an awareness that is just a “blind” flowing off of consciousness (say, such as 
one might have in those moments right before falling asleep)—that it is self-giving and 
offering the opportunity to reflect, an ever-present call for reflection.  
With this, it might sound like what Husserl has done is built a kind of self-manifestation 
into the way that consciousness brings transcendent things to the subject’s awareness.  In other 
words, it may seem as if Husserl is building a reflexive structure into the adverbial aspect of the 
description of consciousness.  But, again, further clarification of this mode of givenness is best 
reserved for another place.15
15. Dan Zahavi (1998; 2003; 2005, chap. 3–4) has, in my opinion, written the most clear and accessible
characterization of this aspect of Husserl’s view (of Husserl’s positive characterization of pre-reflective
self-consciousness) and its function as a transcendental condition on the reflective modification of
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§6 Conclusion: Transparency and Self-Consciousness
If the foregoing is correct, then Husserl’s view of consciousness and self-knowledge combines 
two things that are often thought to be incompatible or, at least, not worth combining: a 
transparency method for the acquisition of self-knowledge (in the reflective modification of 
consciousness outlined in Thomasson’s reductive transformation) with a non-transparent, same-
order awareness conception of conscious experience.  This kind of combination would be 
inconsistent or not worth pursuing if the self-awareness constitutive of conscious experience is 
posited as an evidential ground for reflective self-knowledge.  For this is the very thing that the 
transparency method of reflective self-knowledge is supposed to do without.  But, as we have 
seen, Husserl’s view avoids this potential inconsistency by posting the pre-reflective self-
awareness of consciousness not as an evidentiary ground for self-knowledge—i.e., as a reason 
that justifies the content of the self-attributive judgment—but as a motivation for the act of 
carrying out a transformation (the reductive transformation) on the conscious experience—a 
process which constitutes its own evidentiary ground in the form of an immediate awareness of 
the current lived experience.  Furthermore, if the skeptical argument against any view of 
consciousness that does not have the resources to account for the motivation of a reflective act 
given above is correct, then it turns out that any transparency method of self-knowledge would 
need a model of consciousness that posits pre-reflective self-awareness.  Otherwise, it would 
succumb to the self-undermining problems of skepticism.  So, Husserl’s conception of 
consciousness as involving pre-reflective self-awareness would be a general requirement for any
transparency approach to self-knowledge, making it a view not only of historical interest, but of
great systematic interest as well.16
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